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USDOE FOR NNSA SAOKI/JGLASER/VMCCLELLAND/JCONNERY/MKRUPA

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TAGS: [KNNP](#) [KHLS](#) [TRGY](#) [JA](#)  
SUBJECT: U.S./JAPAN DISCUSSIONS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND  
EMERGENCY RESPONSE

REF: TOKYO 4190

Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS SCHIEFFER FOR REASONS 1.4(B),(G)

11. (SBU) A U.S. delegation led by DOE Deputy Under Secretary for Counterterrorism Steven Aoki, met July 18-19 with a Japanese interagency group headed by Takeshi Nakane, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director General, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Department. The Japanese side consisted of 47 representatives from 12 ministries and agencies, including the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry/Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the National Police Agency, the Coast Guard, and other emergency services agencies. The meeting objectives were to (1) exchange views and discuss the status of U.S.-Japan cooperation related to physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials; (2) expand efforts in the area of emergency response and consequence management to RDD and IND incidents; (3) exchange views on the threat posed to Japanese nuclear facilities and material; (4) discuss the use of simulation and modeling tools to assist in the visualization of possible attack scenarios; and (5) discuss Japanese views on an Information Exchange Agreement. Nakane also use the meeting as an opportunity to review the effect of the July 16, 2007, earthquake on the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station.

12. (SBU) In the aftermath of the earthquake, all seven reactors have been shut down and will remain that way pending completion of safety checks by the operator and reviews by regulators, including NISA (Ref). Prior to the earthquake, three of the seven reactors at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa station had been shut down for regularly scheduled maintenance. The seven reactors generate a total of over 8 GW of electricity. The total annual power generated in Japan is 241 GW, with nuclear supplying a total of 46 GW. On an annual basis, Japan generates approximately seven percent more electricity than it consumes. However, since summer is a peak time for energy consumption, there was talk that some idle fossil fuel plants might be needed to pick up any energy shortages.) The Japanese side noted there had been a minor radioactive release via air and water spillage. The causes of these incidents was under investigation, but in all cases the Japanese noted the reported releases were not significant. (See reftel for further information on the status of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear facility.)

13. (C) The Japanese presented a review of their actions to improve the physical protection of their nuclear plants. Over the past two years, Japan has adopted many new and stringent security measures at their nuclear facilities. They have fielded a Design Basis Threat that includes

sabotage and have instituted criminal penalties for divulging security related information. They have enacted new laws in support of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and other international agreements. The National Police Agency and Cabinet Secretariat representatives noted that have also added

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round-the-clock security guards by the Riot Police Unit (equipped with automatic weapons) at nuclear facilities. They look forward to the next round of bilateral discussions on physical protection to be held in Japan later this calendar year.

14. (C) The U.S. proposal to conduct a workshop on responding to radiological dispersal device (RDD) and improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents is under consideration by the GOJ. Nakane stated such a workshop involves many ministries, going well beyond the purview of those involved primarily in commercial nuclear oversight. The attending ministry representatives agreed to review the U.S. proposal and Nakane said he would deliver a response in the near future.

15. (C) The sides exchanged information and their thoughts on the current threat situation. The U.S. presented a DIA briefing on the threat posed to Japanese facilities by North Korea, considered low at this time. The briefing also provided possible attack scenarios including possible force strength. The briefing was supplemented by a U.S. presentation on a tactical simulation of an attack on a hypothetical nuclear facility. The Japanese talk centered on possible Al-Qaida threats. The Japanese side noted that since they are a staunch ally of the U.S. and have contributed to the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have put themselves at risk. This view was in stark contrast to that espoused by the GOJ two years ago, when they doubted the

Al-Qaida threat to their homeland.

16. (SBU) In that light, the U.S. has spoken with Japanese counterparts on the use of simulation and modeling tools to help visualize possible attack scenarios. These tools are used in the U.S. to supplement current testing methodologies (both rules and performance based). While there was great interest, there seemed to be some confusion as to which ministry would have the lead on such cooperation. The use of these tools would also be useful in visualizing attack scenarios during Japan's upcoming G-8 presidency.

17. (C) Nakane was less hopeful regarding an Information Exchange Agreement. He believes that such an Agreement would require Diet approval which would be difficult to get through due to the sensitive nature of the information being exchanged. He suggested we continue within the current framework and expressed appreciation at the understanding of the U.S.

18. (SBU) One new topic discussed was the possibility of cooperation in the technology and use of non-lethal force during transportation. The National Police Agency representative stated that they needed more time to review their use of such technology and that it could be included in future technology cooperation efforts.

19. (SBU) This cable was cleared by Deputy Under Secretary Aoki subsequent to the delegation's departure.  
Schieffer